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Abstract
Formal models of war termination have been developed along two major
approaches: in one, war is interpreted as a series of battles, where belligerents
exchange denial campaigns; in the other, war is illustrated as a process of
bargaining with mutual punishments. In integrating these two approaches,
we build a dynamic model of war, where two belligerents choose to attack
each other on either force or value in every period. In the early stage of war
when military strength is balanced between the belligerents, they both conduct
(counterforce) denial campaigns. However, toward the end when one side has
depleted its capabilities of ghting, the other side switches to (countervalue)
punishment campaigns to coerce the opponent into capitulation. Accordingly,
while denials largely determine a wars outcome, punishments can inuence its
duration. Unlike existing studies, our theory illuminates the two-way causal
relationship, where military strategies shape war, while war itself a¤ects the
strategies.
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The Fighters are our salvation but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory.
Winston Churchill1
1 Introduction
Theorists in International Relations have developed formal models of war termination
along two major approaches. Models in one approach focus on the political aspect of
war, where two belligerents strive to compel each others surrender by exerting the
power to hurt (Schelling 1966). By nature, this approach consorts with bargaining
models of war (Fearon 2004, 2007; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Levento¼glu and
Slantchev 2007; Powell 2004a, 2004b, 2012; Slantchev 2003a; Wagner 2000). In many
of these punishmentmodels, wartime costs in addition to the revealed informa-
tion as to the opponents resolve and/or strength constitute the major motivation
for belligerents to terminate war, while the relative strength between belligerents
namely the probability for either belligerent to defeat its opponent remains xed
(but often uncertain) throughout war.
The other approach puts emphasis on themilitary aspect of war in that the relative
strength can change through ghting, as portrayed in combat models by Lanchester
(1916) and his followers (Bellany 1999; Langlois and Langlois 2009, 2012) as well as
in random-walk models (Slantchev 2003b; Smith 1998; Smith and Stam 2003, 2004).
These models commonly presume war to be a series of battles, where belligerents
struggle to overpower each other by wielding the ability to diminish the enemys
military strength, or what might be called the power to weaken. According to these
denial models, a loss in battle can cause a disadvantageous military imbalance,
which in turn generates the incentive to surrender. While the punishment models
have been inspired by Clausewitzs (1832: 87) renowned denition of war as merely
the continuation of policy by other means (Reiter 2003; Wagner 2000), the denial
models may better reect Clausewitzs alternative denition of war as nothing but
a duel in a larger scale(p. 75).2
1This statement is inscribed on the wall of the RAF Bomber Command Memorial in London.
2Clausewitz (1832: 90) once stipulated that three broad objectives of military engagement are
the armed forces, the country, and the enemys will.Following his taxonomy, formal models of war
can be categorized into three kinds: war as exchange of attacks on armed forces in the combat models
above; on country (or fort) in the random-walk models; and on will in the bargaining models.
Some models can overlap depicting shifts of military balance while exploring bargaining (Langlois
and Langlois 2009, 2012; Slantchev 2003b; Smith and Stam 2004). Among the three objectives,
This dichotomy in models of war may mirror the long-lasting debate over the
use and e¤ectiveness of military aviation.3 Early proponents of air power, on one
side of the debate, were a¢ rmative of air bombings to destroy not only military
targets in the battlefront but also civilian targets behind there such as the economic
infrastructure, commercial districts, residential areas, and in particular the will of
the people(Douhet 1921). They maintain that strategic bombings on civilians can
pressure the targeted state into capitulation, or concession at least, by raising the
societal costs of further prosecuting the war. In addition to prominent advocates
including William Mitchell, Alexander de Seversky, and Hugh Trenchard (MacIsaac
1986),4 many military strategists and commanders during WWII including Winston
Churchill, Arthur Harris, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Curtis LeMay as
they ordered aerial bombings on cities in massive scales believed in the coercive
e¤ects of punishment campaigns (Biddle 1995, 2002).5
On the other side of the debate, a majority of contemporary scholars have cast
skeptical views toward aerial bombings that aim to inict su¤ering on civilians (Carr
2003: 190-191, 248-251; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Kocher et al. 2011; Lambeth
2000; Pape 1996).6 While rejecting punishment campaigns as a means of coercion,
they contend that the political objectives of war can be better pursued by denial
campaigns consisting of air support and interdiction (Horowitz and Reiter 2001:
152; Pape 1996: 69-79) that are projected onto the enemys military capacity (e.g.,
elded forces, ordnance, arsenals, and weapon plants). According to their tenet, the
targeted state is forced into capitulation once it depletes its capabilities of ghting.
In sharp contrast to the literature on aerial bombardment, where denial campaigns
Clausewitz (1832: 229) prioritized the armed forces. Liddell-Hart (1967: 352) notably disagreed.
3Our wording of denial and punishment follows the literature on aerial bombardment
(Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Pape 1996; Toft and Zhukov 2012). Others studies refer to these terms
as attritionand exhaustion,respectively (Echevarria 2017: 30-46).
4William Mitchell is the Father of the U.S. Air Force, Hugh Trenchard the Father of the Royal
Air Force, Alexander de Seversky the author of the treatise Victory through Air Power lmed by
Disney. The earliest proponents of air power in the West Edgar Gorrell and Lord Tiverton were
also in favor of mass bombing (Williams 1996).
5The word strategy has at least two meanings one in the military sense, and the other in
the game-theoretic sense. For what follows, we use campaign to mean a choice of target in war
and strategy(without militaryas its adjective) to refer to its game-theoretic sense unless their
meanings are obvious.
6Some exceptions in (partial) favor of punishment include: Arreguín-Toft (2001); Stam (1996:
137-139); for air power, Mueller (1998: 205); Warden (1997); Watts (1997: 162-163); and for land
power, Lyall (2009).
are regarded as a more e¤ective means of coercion than punishment campaigns (Belkin
et al. 2000; Biddle 2002; Pape 1996; for drone strikes, Johnston and Sarbahi 2016),
the punishment models have been more prevalent than the denial models in the
theoretical literature (Pape 1996: 7-8). The discrepancy between the aerial and
theoretical literature has been persistent, possibly because we still lack a proper
theoretical instrument with which to address the choice between (counterforce) denial
and (countervalue) punishment in war.7 This choice problem has little relevance to
army or navy but is signicant for the use of air force (Freedman 2003: 5) and nuclear
weapons (Ball 1983; Long 2008: 23-52).8
We thus develop a formal model in a synthetic approach that incorporates both
denial and punishment campaigns as alternatives. In other words, our model fea-
tures a dilemma faced by belligerents in choosing the target of attacks between force
(guns) and value (butter).9 Major questions are: How does (and should) a bel-
ligerent choose the target of attacks between force and value?; How does (and should)
the targeted belligerent react against these attacks?; How do their choices inuence
the outcome and duration of war? To the best of our knowledge, our research is the
rst theoretical attempt to explicitly study this choice problem in a dynamic context.
Our model is built upon the standard war-of-attrition model (Maynard Smith
1974) but critically di¤ers from it in that: (i) each of two belligerents possesses some
military units (arms) at a wars onset; (ii) they choose one of denial,punish-
ment,and surrender in every period; (iii) while denial can weaken the enemy
by destroying his military units, punishmenthurts him by inicting costs.10 They
ght a series of battles, where a loss results in a reduction of one military unit. The
war ends when either belligerent exhausts all its military units (all-out war) or when
either surrenders (limited war). By seeking the rationale for a belligerents choice and
change of targets during war, we illuminate the two-way causal relationship between
military strategies and war military strategies inuence war, and vice versa.
7While some weapons (e.g., MD system for denial, ICBM for punishment) are target-specic,
others (multi-role ghters, cruise missiles) can be used for denial and punishment interchangeably.
8An air force can choose the target of attacks more exibly than an army or navy can. As Stanley
Baldwin warned in his famous 1932 speech, unlike ground and naval forces, the bomber will always
get through.
9Unlike the literature on arms races which commonly depict the production tradeo¤ between
guns and better, ours is of the tradeo¤ concerning destruction.
10Denial here includes not just denial of punishments (Slantchev 2003a) but also denial of denials
(i.e., reduction of an opponents denial capacity). By coercing the targeted belligerent to surrender,
punishment can function to shorten a war.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
military strategy. Section 3 provides the model of war, which will be solved in Section
4 and extended in Section 5. Section 6 elucidates our theory with the Pacic War
as an illustrative case. Section 7 summarizes our theoretical ndings and discusses
further implications toward empirical studies and international laws. Long proofs are
left in Appendix.
2 The Literature on Military Strategy
For the past few decades, empirical studies have discovered the determinants and
e¤ects of military strategy.11 According to them, a military strategy is determined
by a variety of both external and internal factors. The external factors include:
relative military capabilities, war duration, and battle deaths, all of which matter for
the decision to resort to civilian victimization (Downes 2008: 65); institutionalized
alliances, which tend to promote a maneuver strategy (Wallace 2008). The internal
factors are: unstable autocracy, which may rely on a high-variance strategy (Goemans
2000); military culture as a major root of submarine attacks against merchant ships,
aerial bombing on nonmilitary targets, and use of poison gas (Legro 1995); democracy,
advanced industry, and war experience, all of which are inuential on a belligerents
choice out of maneuver, attrition, and punishment (Reiter and Meek 1999).
The empirical literature has also investigated the e¤ects of military strategy on
wars outbreak, duration, and outcome. To recap their ndings on the outbreak,
Epstein (1987) demonstrated that the U.S. direct conventional defense could e¤ec-
tively deter the Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf; Mearsheimer (1983) and Reiter
(1999) revealed the fragility of conventional deterrence against a britzkrieg or ma-
neuver strategy. Regarding the duration, as Bennett and Stam (1996), Reiter and
Stam (2002) and Stam (1996) claimed, a maneuver strategy can shorten war, while
a punishment strategy tends to make it longer. As for the outcome, Arreguin-Toft
(2011) maintained that the combination of direct and indirect strategies matters for
asymmetric warfare; Biddle (2004) underscored the superiority of the modern system,
or a tightly interrelated complex of various techniques at the tactical and operational
levels of war; Carverley (2010/11) attributed the U.S. failure against the Vietcong to
its capital-intensive strategy; according to Reiter and Stam (1998, 2002) and Stam
(1996), maneuver and punishment stand valid against attrition.
While the empirical literature has grown and matured as shown above, the the-
oretical studies on military strategy have remained sparse. Into bargaining models
with incomplete information, some forms of military strategy have been incorporated
such as feigning weakness (Slantchev 2010), fait accompli (Lindsey 2015), and indi-
rect strategy (Tarar 2016). In a non-bargaining context, the choice problem as to
11The literature on military strategy has grown in part to counter the theory of o¤ence-defense
balance (cf. Brown et al. 2004). The counterarguments are found in Mearsheimer (1983); Reiter
(1999); and Reiter and Meek (1999).
the allocation of military resources has been theorized at the operational level in the
sense that the models focus on specic battles or certain theaters rather than on war
as a whole (for o¤ensive resources, Borel 1921; Golman and Page 2009; Hart 2008;
Roberson 2006; Roberson and Kvasov 2012; for defensive resources, Bier et al. 2007;
Powell 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Wang and Bier 2011; Zhuang and Bier 2007, 2011).
With few exceptions (Bennett and Stam 1998; Goemans 2000; Pape 1996: 52),
most of the existing empirical and theoretical studies have commonly presumed mil-
itary strategies to be chosen at wars onset and xed throughout. Although the
presumption of xed military strategy sounds reasonable for certain (especially land
and sea) warfare, where an operation is di¢ cult to modify once invoked, it has lim-
ited applicability to a class of other (aerial) warfare, where belligerents exibly adjust
their means and plans to evolving strategic circumstances. For this reason, we de-
velop a dynamic model that allows the choice of targets (campaignin our words)
to be changed during war. With the setting of exible military strategy, it is enabled
to capture the two-way causal relationship between military strategies and war.
3 The Model of War as Exchange of Denials and
Punishments
Our model aims to analyze how belligerents choose and change the targets of their
attacks in the midst of war and also how they react when attacked. In the model,
two belligerents attack each others either force or value over time. While an attack
on force can reduce the opponents military capabilities, an attack on value inicts
heavier costs on the opponent.
3.1 Analogy to Street Fight
The war that our model represents is analogous to the following scenario on a street
ght, which may inspire the readers imagination. There are two rogues ghting on
a street over indivisible booty (say, a sexy girl). Each of them has two armsand
one head.In the ght, they hit each other on the armor on the head.While a
hit on the armmay break it with a certain probability, a hit on the headinicts
more pain for sure. They continue to hit each other repeatedly until the ght ends
when either rogue has both his armsbroken or when either rogue runs away from
the scene.
3.2 Counterforce vs. Countervalue
The model depicts a war as a series of at most three battles fought between two
belligerents (i; j 2 f; g). Each i of them possesses two military units at the wars
onset, or mi;1 = 2, where mi;t 2 f0; 1; 2g denotes is strength in time period t.12
In each period t = 1; 2; 3;    , they simultaneously choose one of the three options:
to attack the opponents force (denial), to attack its value (punishment), or to
surrender (i 2 fD;P; Sg). While a denial campaign weakens the opponent, a
punishment campaign hurts him.
If i adopts a denial, he can wina battle with a certain probability that depends
on is relative strength to js, or (mi;t)
L
(m;t)
L+(m;t)
L , where L  0 is Lanchesters (1916)
12The setting of mi;1 = 2 is helpful to simplify the transition dynamics (Figure 1) and also to
reduce the problem of multiple equilibria. Even without assuming more than two military units, is
relative (absolute) strength can be controlled by manipulating later-dened L (cPmi;t), which will be
dened later.
,1 ,1
Figure 1: Flow of all-out war.
power.13 In each battle, is winbrings about his success in destroying one of js
military units (mj;t+1 = mj;t   1), and the war subsequently enters the next battle
with the shifted military balance (i.e., mi;t against mj;t 1). A denial by i also inicts
a per-period cost cD  0 on j.
On the other hand, if i adopts a punishment, he cannot wina battle but can
impose a heavier cost cPmi;t on j. The size of c
P
mi;t
depends on is absolute strength
mi;t cPmi;t increases with mi;t and is surely larger than c
D (i.e., cD < cP1 < c
P
2 ). In
addition, it is assumed that cP2 > 2c
D, which substantially simplies the analysis of
equilibrium.
In the model, the pair of the belligerentsstrength (m;t;m;t) functions as a state
vector that a¤ects the prospect of battles and hence of the war as a whole. The
state vector (m;t;m;t) is essential for the analysis of the choice between denial and
punishment on the ground that the distinction in the e¤ectiveness between denial
(determined by the relative strength) and punishment (by the absolute strength) is
possible only with the state vector and would be impossible with a single state variable
of the relative strength.14
The war (and also the game) end with is victory when j is fully disarmed (mj;t =
13Lanchesters power L is interpreted as the degree of relative advantage to the stronger side (i.e.,
either i with mi;t > mj;t) at the tactical/battle level.
14The single state variable is adopted by conventional bargaining models of war (Slantchev 2003b;
Smith 1998; Smith and Stam 2003, 2004).
0) or when j surrenders (j;t = S). The former form of war is referred to as all-out war
(Figure 1), while the latter form as limited war. If i wins the war, i seizes a lump-sum
benet W > 0, while j gains nothing. If both i and j surrender simultaneously, they
both gain nothing.15
3.3 Battles
Depending on the belligerentschoices of targets (; ) and their military capabil-
ities (m;t;m;t), a battle results in one of is winning,losing and indecisive
outcomes in a period. Presuming that the belligerents adopt stationary strategies,
or that they maintain the same actions (; ) as far as they are in the same state
(m;t;m;t), we taxonomize the forms of battle:
Denition 1 (i) A battle is called - battle Mt (more shortly, - battle or
battle Mt) if it is fought with action prole (; ) 2 fD;Pg2 in state Mt 2 f1; 2g2,
whereMt  (m;t;m;t). (ii) Of - battleMt, is winning,losingand indeci-
siveoutcomes in a period are denoted as winijMt , los

ijMt and ind

Mt
, respectively.
In any battle, is win is identical to js loss (i.e., winijMt = los

jjMt ). If a
battle remains indecisive in a period, the same battle will be waged again in the
next period.
For D-D battle Mt, per-period probabilities of the three outcomes are dened as:
Pr
 
winDDjMt

=
(1  ) (m;t)L
(m;t)
L + (m;t)
L
Pr
 
winDDjMt

=
(1  ) (m;t)L
(m;t)
L + (m;t)
L
Pr
 
indDDMt

= ;
15Trivially, it never happens in equilibrium that both belligerents simultaneously choose S, because
either can be better o¤ by choosing D or P instead of S.
where  2 (0; 1).16 In P -D battle, there is no possibility of s win a punishment
brings no victory. Instead, the battle is more likely to remain indecisive:
Pr
 
winPDjMt

= 0
Pr
 
winPDjMt

=
(1  ) (m;t)L
(m;t)
L + (m;t)
L
Pr
 
indPDMt

=  +
(1  ) (m;t)L
(m;t)
L + (m;t)
L
:
Probabilities inD-P battle are dened analogously. P -P battle is won by neither; they
merely hurt each other with no possibility of breaking forces (i.e., Pr
 
indPPMt

= 1).
The distribution of per-period probabilities in each form of - battle is summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1: Per-period probabilities in each - battle.
Pr

win

jMt

Pr
 
ind

Mt

Pr

win

jMt

D-D battle (1 )(m;t)
L
(m;t)
L+(m;t)
L 
(1 )(m;t)L
(m;t)
L+(m;t)
L
D-P battle (1 )(m;t)
L
(m;t)
L+(m;t)
L  +
(1 )(m;t)L
(m;t)
L+(m;t)
L 0
P -D battle 0  + (1 )(m;t)
L
(m;t)
L+(m;t)
L
(1 )(m;t)L
(m;t)
L+(m;t)
L
P -P battle 0 1 0
Unless both the belligerents choose P , s continuation payo¤ in - battle Mt
can be derived recursively:
U

jMt = Pr

win

jMt

U
j(m;t;m;t 1) + Pr

los

jMt

U
j(m;t 1;m;t)
+Pr
 
ind

Mt

U

jMt   c

m;t
=
Pr

win

jMt

U
j(m;t;m;t 1)
+ Pr

los

jMt

U
j(m;t 1;m;t)
  cm;t
1  Pr  indMt  ;(1)
where UijMt is is continuation payo¤ in battleMt on the equilibrium path. Similarly,
s continuation payo¤ can be derived.
16Pr
 
ind

Mt

resembles but critically di¤ers from the discount factor of conventional repeated
games in that it varies depending on (; ).
4 Equilibrium
Focusing on stationary strategies, we adopt Markov Perfect Equilibrium as the solu-
tion of the game. Then each battleMt (with surrenderas an outside option) can be
simplied and represented in normal form (Table 2), and the war can be depicted as a
game with three stages (Figure 1). After deriving equilibria in general battle Mt, we
deliver the conditions for equilibria in specic battles by backward induction from
(1; 1) through (2; 1) and (1; 2) to (2; 2).
Table 2: Battle Mt in normal form.
 D P S
D UDDjMt ; U
DD
jMt U
DP
jMt ; U
DP
jMt W; 0
P UPDjMt ; U
PD
jMt  1; 1 W; 0
S 0;W 0;W 0; 0
4.1 Battle Mt in General
By the comparison of payo¤s for each i 2 f; g in Table 2, equilibria in battle Mt
can be determined.
Lemma 1 In any battle Mt, strategy proles that can constitute an equilibrium are
listed as follows:
(a) (D;D) if UDDjMt  0 and UDDjMt  0;
(b) (D;S) if UDDjMt  0; (b) (S;D) if UDDjMt  0;
(c) (P; S) if UPDjMt  0; (c) (S; P ) if UDPjMt  0;
(d) (DP ; S) if UDDjMt  0 and UPDjMt  0, where DP can be any mixed strategy that
contains D and/or P ;17 (d) (S; DP ) if UDDjMt  0 and UDPjMt  0;
(e)

DSjMt ; 
DS
jMt

if UDDjMt < 0 and U
DD
jMt < 0, where 
DS
jMt (
DS
jMt) is s (s) mixed
strategy that randomly takes D and S such that U
DS
jMtD
jMt = 0 (U
DDS
jMt
jMt = 0).
17DP can be purely D or P .
Among the equilibria in Lemma 1, (D;D) regards the battle as a costly lot-
tery (Reiter 2003; Wagner 2000), so that the repetition of D-D battles resembles to
random-walk models of war (Smith 1998; Smith and Stam 2003, 2004), which depict
war as a series of battles with unpredictable outcomes. Other equilibria correspond
to those in the war-of-attrition model, where either player surrenders immediately, or
both players surrender probabilistically.
Lemma 1 will be utilized to nd equilibria in each specic battle.
4.2 Specic Battles
In any battle Mt, a belligerents rational decision depends on the size of booty W
relative to the costs cD and cPmi;t. If W is su¢ ciently large, both the belligerents are
willing to choose denial; otherwise, either side may surrender.
Proposition 1 In battle (1; 1), all equilibria are:
(i) (D;D) for W 2  W P3rd;1;
(ii) (D;D), (P; S), and (S; P ) for W 2  WD3rd;W P3rd;
(ii) (D;D), (DP ; S), and (S; DP ) for W = WD3rd;
(iii) (DP ; S), (S; DP ), and

DSj(1;1); 
DS
j(1;1)

for W 2  0;WD3rd, where
W P3rd 
2cP1
1  
WD3rd 
2cD
1   :
Proof. As Lemma 1 shows, the equilibria depend on the signs of UDDjMt, U
DD
jMt, U
DP
jMt
and UPDjMt. By Equation (1),
UDDj(1;1) = U
DD
j(1;1) =
W
2
  c
D
1  
UDPj(1;1) = U
PD
j(1;1) = W  
2cP1
1   :
Accordingly, UDDj(1;1) R 0 if W R WD3rd , and UDPj(1;1)  0 if W  W P3rd .
By Lemma 1, equilibria in battle (1; 1) are listed as: (a) (D;D) if W  WD3rd ; (b,
b) (D;S) and (S;D) if W  WD3rd ; (c, c) (P; S) and (S; P ) if W  W P3rd ; (d, d)
(DP ; S) and (S; DP ) ifW  WD3rd andW  W P3rd ; (e)

DSj(1;1); 
DS
j(1;1)

ifW < WD3rd :
Because cD < cP1 , W
D
3rd < W
P
3rd , with which the equilibria can be summarized as in
the proposition.
Proposition 1 is summarized graphically in Figure 2. IfW is not so large, multiple
equilibria emerge where the belligerents may not ght.18 To rule out these uninter-
esting no-ghtequilibria in battle (1; 1); we impose the following restriction:
18If they do not ght in battle (1; 1), neither would they ght in battle (2; 2), because a war
starting with D-D battle (2; 2) is longer and thus more costly than D-D battle (1; 1).
Figure 2: Equilibria in battle (1; 1).
Assumption 1 W > W P3rd:
By making (D;D) the unique equilibrium in battle (1; 1), Assumption 1 greatly
simplies the analysis of battles (2; 1) and (1; 2).
Proposition 2 In battle (2; 1), all equilibria are:
(i) (D;D) for W 2  W P2nd;1;
(ii) (D;D) and (P; S) for W 2  maxW P3rd;WD2nd	 ;W P2nd;
in addition, if W P3rd < W
D
2nd, they are:
(ii) (D;D) and (DP ; S) for W = WD2nd;
(iii) (DP ; S) for W 2  W P3rd;WD2nd, where
W P2nd 
2cD +
 
2L+1 + 2

cP2
1  
WD2nd 
 
2L+1 + 4
 cD
1   :
Trivially, equilibria in battle (1; 2) are identical to those in (2; 1) except that the
players swap sides, because the game is symmetric with respect to them.19 Proposition
2 then implies that the stronger side (e.g.,  in (2; 1)) never surrenders in the second
battles.20 It also holds that the war may proceed along one of the two major paths.21
In one, say the path of ght even with a single arm,where if the booty is su¢ ciently
large (W  WD2nd ), the belligerents ght D-D battles (2; 1) and (1; 2) the weaker
side is willing to ght even a disadvantageous battle. In the other path of no ght
19Equilibria in battle (1; 2) are: (D;D), (S; P ) instead of (P; S), and (S; DP ) instead of (DP ; S)
with the corresponding conditions in Proposition 2.
20This claim appears as Lemma 3 in Appendix.
21We ignore the asymmetric (and implausible) paths, where D-D battle is waged only in either
(2; 1) or (1; 2).
with a single arm(with W  W P2nd ), the weaker side surrenders in battles (2; 1) and
(1; 2). The latter path is plausible if the stronger side is tactically so advantageous
(with a large L) and/or if the damage by punishment is so heavy (with a large
cP2 ). As Proposition 2-(ii, iii) reads that (P; S) holds more broadly than (
DP ; S),
punishment has greater coercive e¤ects than denial (WD2nd < W
P
2nd ). In addition,
punishment functions as a knockout punchin the sense that the weaker belligerent
immediately gives in once it is threatened with punishment.
Below we focus on the former path (of ght even with a single arm) in battle
(2; 2), because battle (2; 2) in the latter path is identical to (1; 1).
Proposition 3 In battle (2; 2) followed by D-D battles (2; 1) and (1; 2), all equilibria
are:
(i) (D;D) for W 2  W P1st; 1;
(ii) (D;D), (P; S), and (S; P ) for W 2  maxW P3rd;WD1st	 ;W P1st;
in addition, if W P3rd < W
D
1st, they are:
(ii) (D;D), (DP ; S), and (S; DP ) for W = WD1st;
(iii) (DP ; S), (S; DP ), and

DSj(2;2); 
DS
j(2;2)

for W 2  W P3rd;WD1st, where
W P1st 
 
2L+1 + 4

cD +
 
2L+2 + 4

cP2
(2L+1 + 1) (1  )
WD1st 
 
2L+2 + 6

cD
(2L + 1) (1  ) :
Among the equilibria in Proposition 3, (D;D) may depict a war with conventional
weapons conventional wars start with exchange of denials, because a punishment has
limited e¤ectiveness (with a small cP2 ). In contrast, (P; S) and (S; P ) may represent
a class of nuclear wars where the threat by a preemptive punishment can compel the
targeted state to immediately surrender. In (DP ; S) and (S; DP ), the booty (W ) is
so small that the state yields even to a preemptive denial.
Since our interests are in conventional wars, we impose the following restriction:
Assumption 2 W > W P1st.
With Assumption 2, the war starts with D-D battle (2; 2).
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Figure 3: Thresholds that demarcate equilibria in three stages.
4.3 Dynamic of Target Choice in War
Utilizing the equilibrium outcomes in each of the three stages above, we next explore
the patterns of target choice in war. The dynamic of target choice in war is shaped
by the transition of the coerciveness of denial and punishment, or the relative sizes of
the thresholds that demarcate equilibria in each of the three stages (W 3rd , W

2nd , and
W 1st for  2 fD;Pg dened in respective Propositions 1, 2 and 3). These thresholds
have the following relationships:22
Lemma 2 Both denial and punishment have the most coercive power in the second
battle; i.e., regardless of L,
W 3rd < W

1st < W

2nd for each  2 fD;Pg :
The relationships among these thresholds determine how the war evolves:
Proposition 4 For W 2  WD2nd;W P2nd, the entire game has the following two equi-
libria: (i) denials are exchanged in all battles; (ii) denials are exchanged in battle
(2; 2), whose winner initiates punishment, and the loser gives in.23
22The thresholds of W (with logarithms) are graphed in Figure 3, given cD = 12 ; c
P
1 = 1; c
P
2 = 2;
and  = 0:95.
23For W > WP2nd , the exchange of denials is the unique equilibrium in all battles (Proposition
Proof. In battles (1; 1) and (2; 2), (D;D) is the unique equilibrium (Assumptions
1 and 2). In battle (2; 1), only (D;D) and (P; S) can be an equilibrium for W 2 
WD2nd ;W
P
2nd

(Proposition 2-(ii)). In addition, since W P1st < W
P
2nd (Lemma 2), there
exists a range of W such that W P1st < W < W
P
2nd . (Recall that Assumption 2 rules
out W  W P1st )
Proposition 4 implies that the war evolves in one of the two paths (Table 3): all-
out war, where denials are exchanged throughout (ght even with a single armin
battles (2; 1) and (1; 2)); limited war, which ends with the weaker sides surrender (no
ght with a single arm). In the latter path, a belligerent who refuses to surrender at
the wars onset may yield to punishment once he loses the rst battle punishment
has more coercive power if the targeted belligerent is disadvantageous.
Table 3: Two equilibrium paths.
1st battle
(2; 2)
2nd battles
(2; 1) & (1; 2)
3rd battle
(1; 1)
All-out war (D;D) (D;D) (D;D)
Limited war (D;D)
(P; S) in (2; 1)
(S; P ) in (1; 2)
(D;D)
o¤ equilibrium
The limited-war equilibrium may o¤er a novel reason for why denials often pre-
cede punishments in conventional wars. As far as the belligerents are evenly matched,
punishment cannot coerce the targeted belligerent into surrender. Without the possi-
bility of surrender, a punishment merely wastes the opportunity of denial to weaken
the opponent. Thus exertion of punishment in the early stage of war disadvantages
the attacker himself in future battles. Only after the attacker overpowers the other,
can punishment become coercive. This result may explain why belligerents do not
resort to punishment at a wars onset.
The current model contains two problems: (1) multiple equilibria can still remain
in battles (2; 1) and (1; 2) (when W 2  WD2nd ;W P2nd), suggesting that the model fails
2-(i)). For W < WD2nd , the loser of battle (2; 2) succumbs even to the winners denial (Proposition
2-(iii)). However, a limited war ending with denial is not so plausible as the one ending with
punishment, because in battle (2; 1), (P; S) can be an equilibrium whenever (D;S) is (Proposition
2-(ii, iii)) punishment has greater coercive power than denial (WD2nd < W
P
2nd ).
to predict whether the war is all-out or limited (Proposition 2-(ii, ii));24 (2) it also
fails to explain why punishment lasted so long as it did in past conventional wars.
In the limited-war equilibrium, once the stronger side initiates punishment, the other
side immediately gives in. This pattern evidently contradicts some past wars during
which civilians were targeted persistently (e.g., the Pacic War).
These two problems can be resolved in light of growing risk associated with pun-
ishment, which we explore next.
24Another possibility to resolve the multiplicity of equilibrium is to make the choices sequential
one party makes his decision earlier than the other in a battle. One may do so by demonstrating his
commitment to a certain campaign. In battle (2; 1), , who prefers (P; S) to (D;D), may commit
himself to punishment, while , for whom (D;D) is preferred, may try to be stuck to denial. An
instance of the former would be the U.S. strategic bombings on Japanese cities during the Pacic
War the U.S. repeatedly demonstrated its resolve for punishment by warning Japan of the bombings
while summoning it to surrender (Zachariasradio broadcast). A well-known instance of the latter
is the Battle of Jingxing (in China, 205 BC), where general Han Xin banned retreat by positioning
his army back to the water a tactic known as burning bridges(Schelling 1966: 43-49).
5 Risk Strategy
To incorporate prolonged punishment, we introduce uncertainty with the severity of
punishment. For punishment to last for certain periods, the targeted belligerents
incentive must shift from choosing D to S over time. Built upon the idea of the risk
strategy (Pape 1996: 66-69; Schelling 1966: 105-109), we consider one of such scenar-
ios. The solution concept for the modied game will be Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Suppose that each belligerent is either hard or soft type (i 2 fih; isg). By a
punishment with mi;t = 2, the hard type ih inicts a severer damage ch on j with per-
period probability "h 2 [0; 1) and the regular damage cP2 with remaining probability
1   "h, while the soft type is inicts a milder damage cs with probability "s 2 (0; 1)
and cP2 with remaining probability 1   "s.25 It is naturally assumed that cP1  cs <
cP2 < c
h.26 Targeted j does not know whether i is hard or soft at the wars onset, but
he knows is prior distribution Pr
 
ih

and Pr (is), where Pr
 
ih

+ Pr (is) = 1.
As i conducts punishments, j can infer is type from precipitated damages. By
Bayesrule, the damage ch (cs) reveals i = ih (i = is) for sure: Pr(ihjch) = 1 and
Pr(isjcs) = 1. Also, if j bears T times of cP2 in succession, he updates his belief as to
ih:
Pr
 
ihjT = Pr  ihPr  cP2 jihT
Pr (ih) Pr (cP2 jih)T + Pr (is) Pr (cP2 jis)T
=
1
1 + Pr(i
s)
Pr(ih)

1 "s
1 "h
T :
If "h < "s, Pr
 
ihjT increases with T , or the risk of the severer damage ch grows over
time, and we assume so.
Amerit of modifying the e¤ectiveness of punishment instead of denial is tractability
it a¤ects equilibria in battles (2; 1) and (1; 2), while maintaining (D;D) as the unique
equilibrium in (1; 1) and (2; 2) if W is su¢ ciently large.27 Below we focus on battle
25The model can work even with "h = 0 as far as "s 2 (0; 1) :
26The irregular damage ch (cs) may represent the attackers advancement of weaponry (tightening
of military budget).
27In battle (1; 1), because there is no uncertainty with cP1 , the equilibrium is uniquely (D;D) by
Assumption 1. In battle (2; 2), the condition for (D;D) to be the unique equilibrium is formally
derived in Appendix. Alternatively, if denial has uncertain e¤ectiveness, belligerentsbehavior in all
three stage games must be re-calculated, and thus the resulting equilibrium analysis would be much
more complicated.
(2; 1), but the following analysis applies symmetrically to (1; 2).
Consider the following strategy prole (P; P 0; T ): (a) h maintains P throughout
the battle; (a) s maintains P and switches to D if cs occurs; (b)  maintains D
and switches to S if ch occurs or if cP2 occurs T
 times successively. If cs occurs, 
maintains D forever.
Given strategy prole (P; P 0; T ), continuation payo¤s of h and s can be dened
as:
UPThj(2;1)  Pr

indPDhj(2;1)
T
W +
1  Pr

indPD
hj(2;1)
T
1  Pr

indPD
hj(2;1)

0@ PrindPD(2;1) "hW+
Pr

losPDj(2;1)

UDDj(1;1)   cD
1A
UP
0T
sj(2;1)  Pr

indP
0D
sj(2;1)
T
W +
1  Pr

indP
0D
sj(2;1)
T
1  Pr

indP
0D
sj(2;1)

0@ PrindPD(2;1) "sUDDj(2;1)+
Pr

losPDj(2;1)

UDDj(1;1)   cD
1A ;
where
Pr

indPDhj(2;1)

 Pr  indPD(2;1)  1  "h
Pr

indP
0D
sj(2;1)

 Pr  indPD(2;1) (1  "s) :
On the other hand, s continuation payo¤ after T times of cP2 can be shown as:
UPP
0D
j(2;1) (T )  Pr
 
hjTUPDj(2;1)jh + Pr (sjT )UP 0Dj(2;1)js ; (2)
where UPD
j(2;1)jh and U
P 0D
j(2;1)js are s continuation payo¤s from choosing D against
hs P and against ss P 0, respectively:
UPDj(2;1)jh 
Pr

winPDj(2;1)

UDDj(1;1)  
 
1  "h cP2   "hch
1  Pr

indPD
hj(2;1)

UP
0D
j(2;1)js 
Pr

winPDj(2;1)

UDDj(1;1) + Pr

indPD(2;1)

"sUDDj(2;1)   (1  "s) cP2   "scs
1  Pr

indP
0D
sj(2;1)
 :
For s learning to be meaningful and inuence his behavior,  should be willing to
ght the soft type but not the hard one:
Assumption 3 (i) UPD
j(2;1)jh < 0. (ii) U
P 0D
j(2;1)js > 0.
If there is no uncertainty, equilibria (D;D) and (P; S) coexist in battle (2; 1) for
W 2  WD2nd ;W P2nd (Proposition 2-(ii)). However, once the uncertainty is introduced,
(D;D) and (P; S) become out of equilibrium, and instead (P; P 0; T ) appears as an
equilibrium if the playersincentive compatibility constraints are met:
Proposition 5 (i) For W 2  WD2nd;W P2nd, the strategy prole (P; P 0; T ) forms an
equilibrium in battle (2; 1) if: (a) UPT

hj(2;1)  UDDj(2;1); (a) UP
0T 
sj(2;1)  UDDj(2;1); (b)
UPP
0D
j(2;1) (?)  0. (ii) T  is the smallest T such that UPP
0D
j(2;1) (T ) < 0.
28
Proof. (i) By Conditions (a, a), h (s) is willing to choose P (P 0) against s T . By
(b), which requires Assumption 3-(ii),  is willing to ght at least for one period. If ch
occurs,  will surrender, because of Assumption 3-(i) with Pr(hjch) = 1. Similarly,
because of Assumption 3-(ii) with Pr(sjcs) = 1, if cs occurs,  will maintain D
forever. Moreover, knowing that  maintains D forever, s switches to D, because
W 2  WD2nd ;W P2nd.
(ii) With "h < "s, as T rises, Pr
 
ihjT increases, and UPP 0Dj(2;1) (T ) decreases. With
a su¢ ciently large T , Pr
 
ihjT converges to one, and UPP 0Dj(2;1) (T ) does to UPDj(2;1)jh.
Since UPD
j(2;1)jh < 0 (Assumption 3-(i)), there must exist T such that U
PP 0D
j(2;1) (T ) < 0,
with which  switches from D to S.
In light of the risk strategy,  does not immediately yield to s punishment.
Through ghting,  speculates on s type with hope for winning. Upon a critical
punishment (ch),  immediately gives in, but otherwise  holds out for a while. Hence,
punishment can persist for certain periods in battle (2; 1).
To look over the series of the battles, the model with uncertainty proceeds as
follows: the war breaks out with exchange of denials in battle (2; 2). As  wins battle
(2; 2), he initiates punishment in battle (2; 1). If  succeeds in punishment (with ch
or T  times of cP2 ), the war ends with s surrender. If  fails, the war goes back
to the exchange of denials. The model depicts the transition from mutual denials to
persistent punishments by the winning side, as observed in the Pacic War.
28The existence of this equilibrium is conditional critically on the prior distribution Pr
 
ih

and
Pr (is) while hs (ss) choice of P (P 0) depends on the timing T  of s surrender, T  depends
on the priors. With larger Pr (is), T  would be larger, and the incentive for h (s) to choose P
(P 0) weaker. The size of T  depends also on the likelihood ratio 1 "
s
1 "h , which determines the speed
of s learning. Given W = 250, cD = 1, cP1 = 1, c
P
2 = 2,  = 0:95, L = 1, "
h = 0, "s = 0:05, cs = 1,
and Pr (is) = 0:25, then (P; P 0; T ) emerges as the unique equilibrium with T  = 7.
6 The Pacic War: From Mutual Denials to One-
Sided Punishments
The Pacic War was waged in ways our theory predicts: (i) denials were exchanged
at the early stage; (ii) punishments were adopted by the winning side (the U.S.)
toward the end; (iii) no or little punishments were taken by the losing side (Japan)
throughout.29
In the War (that broke out in December 1941), the U.S. accomplished overwhelm-
ing victories at the critical battles of Midway (in June 1942), Philippine Sea (in June
1944), and Leyte Gulf (in October 1944). Since the summer of 1944 when Japan lost
the Mariana Islands (the Absolute Zone of National Defense of 1943), the U.S. mil-
itary victory had become evident. However, despite successive losses in battles and
the resulting serious shortage of military resources, Japan continued to prosecute the
War. The U.S. then introduced a series of punishment campaigns, including carpet
bombings on cities (from March 1945), starvationblockades on ports (from March
1945), and nally nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (in August 1945). Only
after the U.S. succeeded in these punishment campaigns, did Japan declare to sur-
render.
The reasons why Japan surrendered have been disputed among historians. While
orthodoxhistorians have maintained the atomic bombings as the major cause of
Japans surrender (Asada 1998; Feis 1961; Frank 1999; Freedman and Dockrill 1994),
the so-called revisionists and their sympathizers have put more emphasis on the
Soviet entry into the War (Alperovitz 1985, 1995; Bernstein 1995, 2007; Hasegawa
2005, 2007; Pape 1993). The former account corresponds to a realization of ch in our
model, while the latter does to a sudden rise in m (where  denotes the Union).
Our theory suggests that it might be inadequate to attribute Japans surrender
especially when it surrendered solely to its either military or civilian vulnerability.
Even when a punishment seems to work, it does so only because of preceding denials
that have made punishment e¤ectively coercive. Denial and punishment may operate
di¤erently in shaping a war.
29Air raids on Oregon (in September 1942) and re ballons (from November 1944) might be few
exceptions that represent Japans attempts at punishment.
7 Conclusion
7.1 Theoretical Findings
This article urges readers to heed an agenda that the theoretical literature has
overlooked the dilemma between force (guns) and value (butter) as targets of
attacks in war. Under what kind of circumstances, which campaign better serves the
purposes of war between (counterforce) denial and (countervalue) punishment? How
do these choices shape war? One of our models novelties is that it allows belligerents
to exibly change their targets during war. This exibility in targeting enables to
depict the two-way causal relationship between military strategies and war that exist-
ing studies have ruled out in one way, the belligerentschoices of targets determine
how the war evolves; in the other, past battles (both their outcomes and duration)
inuence their choices in upcoming battles.
Through equilibrium analyses, we have produced the following theoretical ndings.
Unless punishments are so destructive as nuclear bombings, belligerents initiate war
with an exchange of denial campaigns, which consequently brings about a military
imbalance in favor of the winner of the early battle (precisely, D-D battle (2; 2)).
The war then proceeds along one of the two paths (namely, two equilibria): one is of
all-out war, where the belligerents continue to exchange denial campaigns until either
side is fully disarmed; the other of limited war, where the winner of the early battle
switches to punishment campaign (knockout punch), to which the loser responds by
capitulation. Along either path, the belligerents refrain from punishment in the early
stage of war, because punishment has no or little coercive e¤ect on an opponent with
equal or similar strength. In other words, the coerciveness of punishment depends
on the relative military balance, but this balance is determined by the exchange of
denials. Only after the opponent is su¢ ciently weakened by denial, can punishment
have a coercive e¤ect. Our theory thus holds that denials precede punishments in
limited war (Arreguín-Toft 2001: 108-109; Downes 2008: 115-155; Legro 1995). This
pattern resembles MacNamaras no citydoctrine of 1962 that refrains from attacks
on cities, but the reason we o¤ered above is di¤erent from his doctrines that aims to
keep civilians as hostages(Long 2008:30).30
30There can be other reasons for why denials precede punishments: (i) air superiority with techno-
logical and geographical constraints before engaging aerial bombardment against distant cities, the
attacker needs to secure the air superiority (Pape 1996: 58); (ii) diminishing e¤ectiveness of denial
The discussion above contains two drawbacks: (1) in light of the two equilibria,
the model cannot conclude which is more plausible between all-out and limited wars;
(2) the immediate capitulation in response to punishment in limited war contradicts
patterns of some past wars, where punitive bombings persisted durably (e.g., the
Pacic War). These drawbacks can be overcome once Schellings (1966: 105-109) risk
strategy is introduced. With this extension, the two equilibria can be replaced by a
single equilibrium, where the exchange of denials is followed by the prevailing sides
prolonged punishment.31
To draw implications for air strategies, one of our major ndings consorts with
Papes (1996) assertion that denial constitutes a primary determinant of wars out-
come, while punishment has little impact on it. When the prevailing side initiates
punishment, the tide of war has already been determined.32 Another implication
drawn from our model is that punishment can shorten a war by charging the targeted
belligerent with extra burden of continuing the war.33 In sum, denials largely deter-
mine wars outcome (which side to win), while punishments can inuence its duration
(when to surrender). The Pacic War conforms to our theoretical predictions.
7.2 Implications toward Empirical Studies
Our ndings above cast some concerns toward empirical procedures in existing stud-
ies. Assuming that each belligerent chooses a single military strategy at a wars onset
as the targeted enemy loses its forces in battles, it can become harder for an attacker to achieve
additional tactical success; (iii) reciprocity and its breakup belligerents may refrain from counter-
value campaigns as far as their enemies also refrain (for WWI, Axelrod 1984: 77-87; for WWII,
Legro 1995), but this reciprocal relationship can collapse once either side loses its capabilities of
punishment.
31Out of the two equilibria, the stronger side ( in battle (2; 1)) prefers limited war, while the
weaker side prefers all-out war. Introduction of the risk strategy favors the stronger side the risk
strategy can pull o¤ the victory by punishment as in limited war.
32The loser of D-D battle (2; 2) has little chance to make a recovery and win the war. This claim
holds even if the loss of strength in battle (2; 2) does not cause disadvantage in later battles (i.e.,
L = 0). Even with L = 0, the probability that  wins both D-D battles (2; 1) and (1; 1) in all-out
war is (1=2)2 = 1=4. The probability can be even smaller with L > 0 and furthurmore with the risk
strategy.
33The wars duration depends critically on how quickly the targeted belligerent learns about the
attackers capability of punishment (i.e., 1  "s=1  "h). Prolonged punishment may also stem from
three other possibilities: (i) as a persistent punishment accumulates damages, the per-period cost
su¤ered by the targeted belligerent increases over time; (ii) it takes time for the targeted belligerent
to produce the decision of surrender (e.g., toward the end of the Pacic War, the Japanse leadership
could not produce the decision of surrender until the Emperor nally intervened); (iii) the threshold
of the surrender decision falls over time (Bennett and Stam 1998).
and adheres to it throughout, most of the existing studies have abstracted away the
possibility that belligerentschoices of strategies are inuenced by the ongoing wars
battles.34 Put di¤erently, when the existing studies analyzed the e¤ects of military
strategies on war, they treated military strategies as explanatory variables and cat-
egorized wars outbreak, duration and outcome as dependent variables. However, if
the e¤ectiveness of a certain military strategy changes during a war, it is quite plau-
sible that the belligerents condition their choices of strategies on how the war was
waged.35 That is, past battles of the ongoing war itself can inuence the choice of
military strategy, while military strategies shape how the war will further evolve. If
battlesoutcomes and duration do have such causal e¤ects on military strategies, a
certain strategy might be adopted only in particular circumstances (i.e., the selection
e¤ect).
For instance, if punishment is undertaken only by the side which has fought ad-
vantageously and is almost winning a war, it cannot be concluded that punishment is
an e¤ective strategy to bring about victory (Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Stam 1996:
138). Conversely, it is rather the advantageous military imbalance that prompted bel-
ligerents to adopt punishment. Other studies determined punishment to be ine¤ective
(Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Pape 1996), but it seems so merely because these analy-
ses included punishments used in wrong timing and situation.36 As our theory holds,
punishment is not particularly coercive on its own, but it can be made coercive by
successful denial punishment can be e¤ective but only conditionally. Analogously,
the seemingly causal nding that punishment tends to make a war longer (Bennett
and Stam 1996) contradicts our prediction that punishment can shorten a war if the
punisher has overpowered the opponent. As a way to reconcile this contradiction, it
could be inferred that punishment is more likely to be employed in prolonged wars.37
34To be fair, at least some scholars have acknowledged the e¤ect of battle outcome on military
strategy and consciously ruled it out of their analyses (Stam 1996: 192-193).
35In this regard, our theory suggests that there exists no such thing as dominant military
strategy a strategy that is unconditionally optimal that some scholars contend (Biddle 2004;
Stam 1996: 89, 145-147).
36German bombings on British cities in WWII could be regarded as Hitlers irrational reaction to
British bombings on Berlin.
37Another possible source of this contradiction is the presumption that guerrilla and countercivil-
ian airstrike have the same impacts and are grouped in the same category of punishment despite
their distinct characteristics (Bennett and Stam 1996; Reiter and Meek 1999; Stam 1996; Wallace
2008). Although missing in the literature on military strategy, a starvation blockade can also form
punishment (for WWI, Downes 2008: 83-114; for the U.S. Operation Starvation in the Pacic War,
Frank 1999: 349-360; Pape 1993, 1996: 98-103).
7.3 Erosion of Legal and Moral Constraints during War
Finally, we close our discussion with the implications toward international laws. Our
theory casts a grave concern toward the compliance with international laws that pro-
hibit or restrict attacks on civilians (e.g., Hague IV, IX; Rules of Air Warfare; Geneva
IV, Protocol I; Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol III). As our
theory predicts, even if a belligerent is unwilling to attack civilian targets at wars
onset, it would be tempted to resort to counter-civilian campaigns to ensure its own
victory once it obtains military advantage especially toward the end of war. This
prediction suggests that state leadership may have di¤erent mind sets and incentives
for counter-civilian campaigns in peace time than in war (Downes 2008: 115-155).
In this regard, jus in bello may su¤er the commitment problem (Biddle online) be-
sides the conventional enforcement problem caused by the anarchic nature of world
politics. Massive records on war crimes in past wars conform to this concern some
international laws that aimed to regulate belligerentsbehavior were very often ne-
glected once wars broke out. In fact, it was Franklin Roosevelt who proposed on the
eve of WWII that the belligerents refrain from air bombings on civilian populations
and unfortied cities. In response, Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler agreed with
Roosevelts appeal (Legro 1995: 99). However, as the War escalated to the full scale,
all Britain, Germany, and the U.S. adopted air bombings on cities as if there were no
such agreement (Kennett 1982: 106). The development of international agreements,
norms and laws that can discipline warring states requires the imagination of how
a war pressures state leaders in every scenario. An undertaking to such legal and
institutional arrangements will presumably remain a very hard challenge.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Among the nine pure-strategy proles in Table 2, only
(D;D), (D;S), (S;D), (P; S), and (S; P ) can be an equilibrium, leaving no possibility
of equilibrium for other pure-strategy proles. (P;D) cannot be an equilibrium,
because UDDjMt > U
PD
jMt. This inequality always holds, since Pr

winPDjMt

= 0 (namely,
 cannot win a battle by choosing P ) and Pr
 
indPDMt

> Pr
 
indDDMt

(for , a
battle against s D is longer and more costly with P than with D). For the same
reason, (D;P ) cannot be an equilibrium. Trivially, neither (P; P ) nor (S; S) can be
an equilibrium.
For (a, b, b), each is best response against js D is D if UDDijMt  0 and S if
UDDijMt  0.
For (c, c), (P; S) can be an equilibrium if UPDjMt  0 (or if  prefers S to D against
s P ); similarly, (S; P ) can be if UDPjMt  0.
For (d, d) that combine (b, b) and (c, c), if j chooses S, i gains W by D, P , or
any strategy that mixes them.
For (e), in an equilibrium where both players randomize their strategies, each
player must be indi¤erent between the actions he takes with positive probabilities.
If UDDjMt < 0 and U
DD
jMt < 0, there exists

DSjMt ; 
DS
jMt

such that U
DS
jMtD
jMt = 0 and
U
DDS
jMt
jMt = 0, or that  and  are indi¤erent between D and S. In addition, because
each i prefers D to P against js D or P (in fact, D weakly dominates P ), no mixed-
strategy equilibrium (other than those in (d, d) where either i chooses S for sure)
can contain P with a positive probability. If P cannot be contained, the only possible
mixed-strategy equilibrium is

DSjMt ; 
DS
jMt

.
Lemma 3 In battle (2; 1), there exists no equilibrium where  surrenders.
Proof. As with Proposition 1, s decision depends on the signs of UDDj(2;1) and U
DP
j(2;1).
By Equation (1) with Uij(1;1) = U
DD
ij(1;1) (the equilibrium of battle (1; 1) is only (D;D)
by Assumption 1),
UDDj(2;1) =
2L + 1
2
2L + 1
W   2
L + 2
2L + 1
cD
1  
UDPj(2;1) = W  
2L + 1
2L
cP1
1   ;
both of which are positive, or W > max

(2L+1+4)cD
(2L+1+1)(1 ) ;
(2L+1)cP1
2L(1 )

by Assumption 1
(recall cD < cP1 ). Therefore, none of (S;D), (S; P ), (S; 
DP ) and

DSjMt ; 
DS
jMt

in
Lemma 1 can be an equilibrium of battle (2; 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. This proof is also based on Lemma 1. Since UDDj(2;:1) > 0
and UDPj(2;1) > 0 by Lemma 3, equilibria in battle (2; 1) depend on the signs of U
DD
j(2;1)
and UPDj(2;1), which are:
UDDj(2;1) =
1
2L + 1
W
2
  2
L + 2
2L + 1
cD
1  
UPDj(2;1) =
W
2
  c
D +
 
2L + 1

cP2
1   ;
by Equation (1). Hence, UDDj(2;1) R 0 if W R WD2nd , and UPDj(2;1)  0 if W  W P2nd ,
where WD2nd < W
P
2nd regardless of L. Because W > W
P
3rd (Assumption 1), equilibria
in (ii, iii) are non-existent if WD2nd < W
P
3rd .
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof also relies on Lemma 1. By Equation (1) with
Uj(2;1) = U

j(1;2) = U
DD
j(2;1) and U

j(2;1) = U

j(1;2) = U
DD
j(2;1),
UDDj(2;2) = U
DD
j(2;2) =
1
2
W   2
L+1 + 3
2L + 1
cD
1  
UDPj(2;2) = U
PD
j(2;2) =
2L + 1
2
2L + 1
W  
 
2L + 2

cD +
 
2L+1 + 2

cP2
(2L + 1) (1  ) :
The signs of them determine the equilibria: UDDj(2;2) R 0 if W R WD1st ; UDPj(2;2)  0 if
W  W P1st , where WD1st < W P1st regardless of L, because cP2 > 2cD.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof comparesW 1st ,W

2nd , andW

3rd for each  2 fD;Pg.
When L = 0,
WD1st =
5cD
1  ; W
D
2nd =
6cD
1  ; W
D
3rd =
2cD
1  ;
W P1st =
2cD+ 8
3
cP2
1  ; W
P
2nd =
2cD+4cP2
1  ; W
P
3rd =
2cP1
1  ;
ensuring that W 3rd < W

1st < W

2nd for each  2 fD;Pg with L = 0. As L increases,
WD1st (W
P
1st ) decreases and converges to
4cD
1  (
2cD+2cP2
1  ), W
D
2nd (W
P
2nd ) increases, and
WD3rd (W
P
3rd ) remains constant. Thus, their relative sizes are maintained even if L
increases.
Equilibrium Condition for (D;D) in Battle (2; 2) with the Risk Strategy
In battle (2; 2), (D;D) forms the unique equilibrium if each type of i is willing to
choose D regardless of js type and strategy, or if for  2 h; s	 and  2 h; s	,
UDDj(2;2)j 
UPP
0T 
j(2;1)
2
+
UT
PP 0
j(1;2) (?)
2
  c
D
1   > 0
UDPj(2;2)j  UPP
0T 
j(2;1)   2
(1  ") cP2 + "c
1   > 0;
where UT
PP 0
j(1;2) (?) = UPP
0T 
j(2;1) (?) (in Equality (2)), while " = "h ("s) and c = ch (cs)
for  = h (s). (By Uj(2;2)j, both types of  () choose  ().) These conditions
indicate that  is willing to choose D against denial or punishment by  2 h; s	.
Because (D;D) is pooling, no learning of the types is possible.
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